Normative Theory, Deliberative Democratic Politics, and Associations by JUFUKU Masami
Normative Theory, Deliberative Democratic
Politics, and Associations
著者 Jufuku Masami
出版者 法政大学社会学部学会
journal or
publication title
社会志林
volume 62
number 2
page range 51-85
year 2015-09
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10114/11558
51
No	matter	what	the	groups	are,	it	is	inevitable	to	have	conflicts	of	interests	and	values,	and	the	
battle	for	their	preferences	and	principles	(subjects	ranging	from	family	and	neighbor	relationships	
to	“Village	Earth”	or	from	child	abuse	to	global	warming	countermeasures).	 	This	 is	because	the	
individuals	 constituting	each	group	all	 have	different	personalities	 and	come	 from	different	
backgrounds;	they	are	all	aspiring	to	realize	different	objectives.		However,	so	long	as	“other	people	
with	differences”	try	to	live	together,	their	conflicts	and	feuds	will	have	to	be	“resolved”	in	one	way	
or	another,	thus	necessitating	the	coordination	of	their	actions.			In	that	case,	as	a	rule,	there	are	
only	two	methods:	violence	or	dialogue.		In	reality,	of	course,	since	there	exist	discrimination	and	
exclusion	by	 class,	gender,	 race,	 and	 religion,	unequal	 power	 relations,	 and	differences	 in	
knowledge,	 information,	and	the	ability	to	express	oneself,	violent	and	coercive	resolutions,	both	
tangible	and	intangible,	become	dominant.		On	the	other	hand,	it	is	not	only	proved	in	the	histories	
of	all	 ages	and	cultures	but	also	by	cold,	hard,	daily	 fact	 that	 returning	violence	 for	violence	
multiples	violence	and	offers	no	 fundamental	 solution	 to	any	problem	 (Chambers	1996:	4-9).	
Therefore,	“the	communicative	mastery	of	these	conflicts	constitutes	the	sole	source	of	solidarity	
among	strangers—strangers	who	renounce	violence	and,	also	in	the	cooperative	regulation	of	their	
common	life,	concede	one	another	the	right	to	remain	strangers”	(Habermas	1998:	374).		In	other	
words,	“the	premise	that	the	interested	parties	want	to	resolve	their	conflicts	not	through	violence	
or	compromise,	but	through	mutual	consent”	(Habermas	1983:	56)	provides	a	starting	point.
If	 that	 is	 the	case,	 the	 first	assignment	can	be	given	 in	 the	 following	manner:	based	on	 the	
premise	of	resolving	an	actual	issue	in	the	ideal	way,	what	should	we	do	to	move	closer	to	a	solution	
by	discussion?		One	of	the	necessary	tasks	for	that	is	to	reconstruct	the	conditions	for	resolution	by	
discussion	into	an	ideal	type.		However,	this	ideal	type	cannot	be	the	result	of	a	thought	experiment.	
This	is	because	those	conditions	must	be	reconstructed	based	on	“fragments	of	an	existing	reason	
(Habermas	1998:	349)”	scattered	in	an	actual	discussion.		However,	this	ideal	can	never	be	realized	
in	practice	(Habermas	1996:	37).		It	means	assuming	a	world	made	up	of	“angels	and	gods.”		What	is	
possible	for	humans	to	do	is	to	attempt	to	get	closer	to	the	ideal	type	by	analyzing	and	critiquing	
reality	based	on	it	(Peters	1994:	51;	2001:	655-668)	and	by	reforming	actual	discussions.
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Next,	with	those	ideal	types	in	mind,	the	author	will	examine	what	issues	politics	in	reality	may	
contain,	how	deliberative	democratic	politics,	which	 is	supposed	to	resolve	those	problems,	may	
take	shape,	and	finally,	outline	the	potential	of	deliberative	democratic	society	and	economy	with	
associations	as	their	key	elements.
1　Deliberative Democracy as a Normative Theory: Participation, Equality  
  　and the Universalizability Principle
(1) Formal Conditions: Participation, Equality, Independence, and Disclosure
< Participation >　Suppose	some	of	the	parties	concerned	in	a	certain	dispute	 	(not	only	the	
parties	directly	involved	but	also	those	who	may	possibly	receive	a	direct	or	indirect	influence	from	
the	 implementation	of	a	solution)	were	excluded	from	the	forum	of	discussion,	or	the	remaining	
majority	agreed	to	a	certain	solution.		Would	those	who	were	excluded	be	obliged	to	act	according	
to	that	agreement?		They	were	not	at	all	 involved	in	reaching	the	agreement	since	they	had	been	
deprived	of	 the	opportunity	 to	express	 their	own	opinions	and	will,	 and	 then	argue	 for	 them.	
Despite	that,	if	they	were	forced	to	comply	with	the	agreement,	they	would	be	subservient	to	the	
will	and	action	of	other	people,	which	is	nothing	less	than	an	act	of	violence.		For	this	reason,	each	
and	every	person	concerned	in	a	dispute	must	be	able	to	participate	in	the	discussion	forum	without	
exception.		(Needless	to	say,	the	condition	for	participation	in	this	discussion	is	not	limited	to	just	an	
“actor	with	language	capabilities.”		That	is	because	if	this	condition	is	limited,	the	number	of	people	
to	be	excluded	will	increase	tremendously).		What	is	important	here	is	to	be	aware	that	there	are	a	
great	many	people	who	are	practically	excluded	from	participation	despite	their	desire	(for	example,	
people	with	very	little	economic	and	temporal	 latitude,	and	people	with	age	limitations)	as	well	as	
people	of	constant	minority	status	(such	as	homosexuals),	and	therefore,	to	always	strive	to	have	
the	discussion	forum	opened	to	those	people.	 	Another	 important	point	 is	that	we	must	give	full	
consideration	to	future	generations	who	may	not	be	able	to	participate	in	such	an	event	depending	
on	the	current	agreement	in	existence.
< Equality of Opportunity >　The	status	and	power,	and	 language	and	expression	skills	of	
participants	are	unequal.	 	 If	 this	 inequality	was	brought	 to	 the	discussion	 forum	and	certain	
participants	(groups)	exercise	dominant	power,	opinions	of	other	participants	(groups)	would	be,	in	
effect,	suppressed	and	excluded.	 	That	would	be	a	violent	action,	and	even	 if	a	solution	were	
achieved,	 it	would	be	an	unfair	one.	 	Therefore,	equal	opportunity	must	be	guaranteed	 to	all	
participants	with	regards	to	making	a	statement,	discussion,	as	well	as	consent	or	refusal.	 	 (The	
logical	premise	here	 is	 that	all	participants	 respect	others	as	equal	actors,	but	 if	 this	were	a	
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prerequisite	to	reality,	 it	would	end	up	limiting	the	range	of	participants	quite	narrowly.	 	This	 is	
because	humans,	no	matter	how	hard	we	try	to	consider	others	as	equal,	cannot	deny	our	self-
serving	nature;	we	tend	to	prioritize	our	own	interests	over	theirs.		On	the	other	hand,	there	is	no	
need	to	make	the	above	premise	a	prerequisite.		For	we	can	presume	in	the	discussion	process	that	
the	participants	who	take	away	equal	opportunity	from	others	will	eventually	lose	trust	as	discussion	
partners	and	their	credibility	will	be	questioned.	 	At	the	same	time,	through	such	an	experience,	
they	may	possibly	come	to	learn	the	necessity	of	respecting	others	and	cannot	help	but	regret	their	
actions	(Gastil/Levine	2005:	282-284).)
< Self-Independence >　Each	 of	 the	 participants	 can	 freely	make	 comments	 as	 a	 self-
independent	person	with	no	restrictions	or	interference	from	others.		In	other	words,	there	must	be	
no	limitation	whatsoever	in	principle	regarding	the	subject	of	discussion,	comments	and	arguments,	
criticisms	of	other	participants’	comments	and	arguments,	countercriticisms	to	others’	criticisms,	
as	well	as	the	procedure	and	rules	of	discussion.		The	reason	is	that,	so	long	as	conflicts	and	feuds	
are	rooted	 in	our	 interests,	values,	preferences	and	beliefs,	even	 though	there	are	cases,	we	
assume,	 in	which	 it	 is	necessary	to	step	 into	the	realm	of	the	moral	consciousness	or	religion	 in	
order	to	resolve	an	issue,	 if	we	avoid	that,	 it	will	be	 impossible	to	carry	out	the	discussion,	thus	
arriving	at	no	solution.	 	 (However,	to	have	the	 issue	of	moral	consciousness	as	the	subject	of	a	
discussion	does	not	mean	that	the	realm	of	sense	of	morality	will	be	interfered	with	and	regulated,	
and	also,	the	subject	matter	is	not	decided	beforehand;	it	depends	on	how	the	discussion	among	the	
participants	goes.		Needless	to	say,	all	is	also	premised	on	the	agreement	of	the	parties	concerned.)	
Although	there	may	be	inconsistent	and	contradictory	comments	or	insincere	false	statements—
and	we	may	request	that	participants	stop	making	such	comments	or	even	ban	them—this	should	
not	be	a	prerequisite	 for	participation.	 	Human	beings	tend	to	make	those	comments,	often	not	
intentionally.	 	Despite	that,	people,	by	necessity,	will	 learn	 if	 the	discussion	continues.	 	This	 is	
because	as	 long	as	the	discussion	continues	using	verbal	and	non-verbal	 language	(such	as	 facial	
expressions	and	gestures),	no	matter	how	self-serving	one’s	motivation	may	be	 (with	strategic	
behavior	to	take	advantage	of	the	counterpart	in	order	to	realize	one’s	own	objectives),	eventually,	
factors	such	as	seeking	to	attentively	 listen	to	and	understand	the	counterpart	 (communication-
oriented	behavior)	will	begin	to	function	and	one	will	be	“forced	to	shift	the	perspective”	toward	the	
speaker	(Habermas	1998:	72).
< Disclosure >　Although	the	above	conditions	are	all	met,	if	that	discussion	is	conducted	in	a	
“closed	room”	where	the	concerned	parties	are	participating,	it	means	an	exclusion	of	opinions	and	
arguments	of	people	already	 interested	 in	 the	 issue,	as	well	as	social	movements	and	citizens’	
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groups,	and	particularly	those	who	may	grow	interested	in	the	issue	via	information	transmitted	by	
the	media	and	journalists.		Most	of	all,	it	is	not	that	the	extent	and	depth	of	the	concerned	issue	are	
known	in	advance.		Or	the	discussion	may	influence	those	who	are	not	 in	the	range	of	the	parties	
involved.		Also,	the	issue	may	be	worth	discussing	among	others	as	well.		Therefore,	discussion	as	a	
rule	should	always	be	open.	 	 (Still,	 there	are	exceptional	cases	 in	which	the	nature	of	the	 issue	
forces	the	discussion	to	remain	undisclosed.		For	instance,	cautious	consideration	is	required	where	
privacy	issues	are	involved.)
The	above	formal	conditions	can	be	summarized	in	the	following	(Habermas	1988:	62).		“①	Those	
who	may	be	able	to	comment	on	the	matter	concerned	must	not	be	excluded;	②	everyone	must	be	
granted	equal	opportunity;	③	participants	must	carefully	consider	 their	 statements	 [with	all	
sincerity].	([　]	denote	the	author’s	supplementary	notes,	hereafter);	④	and	communication	must	
be	liberated	from	both	external	and	internal	coercion.		In	other	words,	the	decision-making	on	the	
right-or-wrong	 position	 on	 the	 request	 for	 criticizable	 validity	 is	 motivated	 only	 by	 the	
persuasiveness	of	better	 reasons	 [Directly	quoted.	 It	 is	not	persuasiveness	but	 the	ability	 to	
convince.].”		(However,	even	though	“sincerity”	in	③	certainly	should	be	requested,	as	already	
stated,	it	is	not	necessarily	a	prerequisite.)
Here,	the	key	question	 is	what	are	the	“better	reasons”	in	④	and	how	should	they	be	based?	
This	 is	a	key	 issue	because	 it	can	be	a	substantive	condition	to	directly	prescribe	the	content	of	
problem	solving;	the	issue	of	basing	means	to	explore	the	process	in	which	how	“better	reasons”	
are	shaped,	and	the	conditions	for	its	formation.		That	is	to	say,	in	addition	to	a	free,	equal	and	open	
discussion	by	its	participants,	the	following	deliberation	will	also	be	necessary.		(However,	there	is	
also	the	predominant	view	that	the	basing	 issue	does	not	exist;	 in	other	words,	 it	 is	potentially	
included	in	the	formal	conditions.		“The	decision	based	on	equality,	by	a	‘deliberative’	procedure,	
relies	on	 the	argument	preceding	 to	 the	decision;	 thus,	 only	 the	 legitimate	decision	will	 be	
included).		Furthermore,	this	procedure	includes	all	the	parties	concerned	(Therefore,	they	can	all	
participate).	 	And	through	this	procedure,	all	 the	participants	have	no	choice	but	to	accept	each	
other’s	perspective.	(Therefore,	it	makes	it	possible	to	have	a	fair	comparative	weighing	of	all	the	
interests	concerned.)		This	is	the	epistemological	meaning	of	the	procedure	to	discover	neutral	and	
fair	decisions	(Habermas	2004:	183-185).”		(However,	 it	remains	vague	as	to	why	the	participants	
will	“[by	necessity]	accept	each	other’s	perspective”	because	of	participation	and	equality.)		“For	a	
rational	deliberation,	two	conditions	are	required	.	.	.			to	guarantee	the	inclusion	of	all	interested	
parties,	 the	 transparency	of	deliberation,	and	 the	equal	opportunity	 for	participation	 [a	 formal	
condition],	and	then	base	the	 inference	of	rational	conclusion.	 	 …		[the	 latter]	 is	based	on	the	
following	 assumption:	 a	 proper	 institutionalization	 of	 deliberation	 means	 	 to	 present	 the	
establishment	of	 important	 issues,	the	subject	matter,	requests,	necessary	 information,	and	the	
55
Normative	Theory,	Deliberative	Democratic	Politics,	and	Associations
proper	grounds	[reasons]	for	argument,	for	and	against,	and	evaluate	those	discussions	by	the	level	
of	explanation	appropriate	 for	the	concerned	 issue	[the	“discovery”	of	“better	reasons”].	 	As	a	
result,	 the	 for-and-against-attitude	making	 is	rationally	motivated	(thus,	 this	attitude-making	 is	
established	without	deception	or	coercion	based	on	 insights	 [better	 reasons].	 	And	 then	 the	
conclusions	consistent	with	the	procedure	are	drawn	(Habermas	2008:	148).”
Now,	then,	what	is	the	deliberation	upon	which	to	base	“better	reasons”?
(2) The Universalizability Principle: Substantive Conditions  
< Limitations to Persuasion >　Let	us	use	the	 following	case	as	a	clue	to	think	about	this.	
Suppose	that	corporate	owner	A	demanded	that	worker	B	be	transferred,	and	B	refused	(Rehg	
1994:	73-79).		Let’s	assume	that	A,	although	able	to	force	the	transfer	by	order,	decided	to	resolve	
the	issue	through	dialogue.		A	will	try	to	persuade	B	by	giving	reasons	he	considers	justifiable	for	
his	demand,	such	as	“Workers	are	employed	by	a	corporate	owner.	 	Therefore,	employees	are	
under	 obligation	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 owner’s	 policy.”	 	 (Generally	 speaking,	 argument	 is	
individualistic	and	specific	while	reason	 is	more	universal	and	abstract.	 	 In	this	case,	while	A’s	
argument	designates	to	the	specific	 individual	B	a	certain	place	for	the	place	of	employment.	A’s	
reason	is	premised	on	the	fact	that	a	corporation	retains	the	authority	to	demand	transfer	of	all	its	
employees,	and	to	the	rest	of	 the	workers	besides	B).	 	B	will	question	and	criticize,	offering	a	
counterargument.	 	“I	want	 to	know	 the	details	of	 the	management	 status.	 	My	 transfer	will	
contribute	to	a	productivity	decline	at	the	present	workplace.		Also,	it	will	be	impossible	for	me	to	
nurse	my	family	member,	which	is	very	important	to	me.”		If	A	persists	and	clings	to	his	argument,	
continuing	the	position	to	persuade	his	counterpart,	it	will	be	impossible	to	gain	agreement	from	B.	
This	is	because	people,	by	nature,	stay	self-centered	no	matter	how	much	we	try	to	understand	and	
give	consideration	to	the	positions	of	others;	our	understanding	and	consideration	persistently	stem	
from	our	own	points	of	view.		Thus,	to	persuade	another	person	means	nothing	but	a	self-privileging	
position	by	which	one	characterizes	that	person	as	a	target	of	persuasion.	 	Therefore,	the	idea	of	
persuasion	contains	a	sense	of	control	over	others.		For	this	reason,	in	order	to	exclude	the	danger	
and	realization	of	control,	what	we	need	 is	a	self-relativization.	 	To	do	so,	 there	are	no	other	
methods	but	having	a	realistic	dialogue	with	others,	particularly	those	one	considers	different	or	
foreign	(Young	1997:	382-406;	Fearon	1998:	49-52).		Now,	what	is	a	realistic	dialogue	and	what	are	
the	conditions	to	make	it	possible?		We	need	to	answer	these	questions	before	taking	the	first	step	
toward	achieving	an	agreement	based	on	understanding.
< Understanding and the Acquisition of Perspectives >　One	condition	is	to	listen	attentively	
to	and	understand	others.	 	To	understand	means	not	only	to	know	what	the	argument	of	another	
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person	means	(sharing	of	meaning)	but	also	why	that	person	makes	that	argument,	i.e.,	the	reason	
existing	at	the	root	of	his	argument.		To	paraphrase,	it	is	about	knowing	how	to	grasp	the	situation	
from	the	perspective	of	another	person	(the	acquisition	of	the	other	person’s	perspective).		A	must	
consider	the	possible	consequences	B’s	transfer	may	cause,	as	well	as	whether	B	can	accept	those	
consequences	when	 looking	 from	B’s	perspective	and	his	 interests.	 	Once	we	 learn	how	to	see	
things	from	different	perspectives	through	understanding	and	careful	listening,	this	can	lead	to	not	
only	a	relativization	but	also	an	expansion	of	our	perspectives.		If	others	do	the	same,	we	can	expect	
similar	results.		(Of	course,	it	is	impossible	to	completely	understand	other	people.		And	even	if	it	is	
possible,	perhaps,	one	may	start	growing	identical	to	another	person,	and	may	have	to	abandon	the	
perspective	and	position	of	his	own.	 	Thus,	we	have	 to	understand	 the	 limited	definition	of	
understanding	the	argument	of	others	and	 its	reasons	 in	a	realistic	dialogue.	Also,	perspective	
acquisition	differs	 from	the	so-called	Golden	Rule,	which	has	not	grown	out	of	the	self-centered	
quality	of	“Don’t	do	to	others	what	you	don’t	want	them	to	do	to	you.”		Furthermore,	it	differs	from	
the	exchange	of	positions	by	imagination.		No	matter	how	fair	one	claims	to	be	as	an	observer,	that	
person	 is	 still	 an	 observer	 established	 from	 the	position	of	 an	 actor	himself	with	 a	 limited	
perspective.		In	addition,	the	so-called	perspective	shift	theory	can	be	misleading,	too.		The	theory	
tends	to	emphasize	only	one	aspect:	A	moves	and	shifts	from	his	own	perspective	to	B’s	perspective.	
While	retaining	his	own	perspective,	A	additionally	acquires	or	overwrites	B’s	perspective.		That	is	
why	expanding	one’s	perspective	is	possible.		“A	self-renunciation	mediated	by	others	enables	a	new	
self-renewal	by	the	death	of	old	self.		Others	can	set	off	a	dissimilation	from	myself	or	a	change	in	
my	identity	without	seizing	me.		When	this	happens,	my	freedom	is	achieved	not	as	the	will	 for	a	
power	that	assimilates	and	rules	others,	nor	the	will	for	a	larger	power	of	the	collective	ego	fused	
with	others,	but	a	freedom	to	liberate	myself	from	the	narrow	cell	where	I	have	locked	myself	up	
(Inoue	1999:		232).”)
< Revision and the Universalizability Principle >	 	Another	condition	 is	based	on	the	above	
understanding	of	others	(perspective	acquisition	and	expansion):	A	will	revise	and	limit	the	initial	
argument	and	reasons	by	presenting	a	new	version	of	argument	and	reasons,	which	A	believes	has	a	
higher	possibility	of	satisfying	B,	 thus	making	them	a	 target	of	 the	dialogue.	 	B,	 following	his	
interests	and	values,	will	examine	 the	result	and	 influence	predicted	 to	be	caused	 if	 the	new	
proposal	is	implemented.			If	B	is	satisfied	with	the	new	proposal	without	coercion,	A	and	B	are	both	
satisfied,	which	means	that	the	argument	and	reasons	common	to	the	both	parties	(more	universal	
than	the	individual	reasons	in	particular,	therefore	“better	reasons”)	have	been	formed	and	created	
(If	B,	like	A,	is	assumed	to	perform	the	act	of	revising	and	creating	a	new	proposal,	this	process	will	
become	symmetric).	 	Needless	to	say,	these	common	arguments	and	reasons	are	not	the	same	as	
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“discovering”	the	then-existing	ones	before	the	dialogue.	(Yet,	they	are	not	to	be	excluded,	either.)	
Through	the	process	of	dialogue,	those	arguments	and	reasons	were	created	for	the	first	time	as	the	
result	of	mutual	actions	 including	revision,	presentation	of	a	new	proposal,	examinations	and	
understanding.	 	The	core	point	of	 this	process	was	that	the	new	proposal	had	content	that	was	
satisfactory	to	both	A	and	B	and	in	accordance	with	their	 interests	and	values.		It	means	that	the	
proposal	was	universalizable.		Of	course,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	achieved	agreement	was	fair	
or	right.	 	It	merely	means	that	we	could	“infer	the	 judgment	to	be	fair”	(Habermas	1996:	37-38)	
since	the	positions	of	both	parties	were	equally	considered.		(In	addition,	the	resulting	agreement	
was	merely	a	provisional	one,	and	at	the	same	time,	by	necessity,	would	be	revised.		The	range	of	
the	parties	concerned	can	change	as	well	as	 information	and	knowledge.	 	Unexpected	results	and	
influences	may	occur.		Above	all,	the	premise	of	the	agreement,	 in	addition	to	political,	economic	
and	social	conditions,	will	change.	 	Needless	 to	say,	 if	 the	agreement	had	not	been	achieved,	
another	new	proposal	would	have	been	needed.		In	principle,	this	process	will	continue	indefinitely.	
Normally,	 however,	 another	 policy	 including	 compromise	 would	 be	 adopted	 due	 to	 time	
restrictions.)
Let	us	call	a	principle	that	enables	an	inference	of	fair	 judgment	the	universalizability	principle.	
“Better	reasons”	are	universalizable	 interests	and	values,	and	a	discussion	that	shapes	them	is	a	
mutual	action	(a	deliberation)	to	create	common	reasons	through	conflicts	and	revisions	(Cohen/
Arato	1992:	350-360).		(Conversely,	there	are	clear	errors	in	views	that	equate	deliberation	to	the	
acceptance	and	agreement	by	participants	without	clarifying	it	in	connection	with	“better	reasons”	
and	have	spread	widely,	as	in	the	following:	“The	important	feature	of	genuine	deliberation	is	that	
participants	 find	 reasons	 that	 they	can	accept	 in	collective	actions,	not	necessarily	 that	 they	
completely	endorse	the	action	or	find	it	maximally	advantageous”	(Fung	2003:	17).)
Lastly,	summarizing	the	above	points	 from	the	standpoint	of	normative	theory,	we	have	the	
following:	“The	rules	of	conduct	that	all	the	parties	involved	have	examined	the	result	and	influence	
predicted	to	occur	when	carrying	out	certain	rules	of	conduct	according	to	the	 interests	of	each	
individual	[and	have	jointly	created	“better	reasons”]	and	agreed	upon	without	coercion—only	those	
rules	of	conducts	are	the	legitimate	rules	of	conduct	(Habermas	1996:	61;	Rehg	1994:	73-75).		Since	
all	individuals	were	convinced	and	agreed,	those	rules	of	conduct	have	binding	power,	both	internal	
and	external,	over	all	the	parties	concerned;	thus,	everyone	is	obliged	to	comply	with	them	and	is	
forced	 to	 fulfill	 the	obligation.	 	 In	other	words,	 they	assume	a	normative	character,	even	 the	
character	of	a	legitimate	norm	(compared	to	the	existing	norm	commonly	accepted	as	a	fact).			And	
considering	that	social	norms,	 including	law	and	morality,	are	also	rules	of	conduct,	the	following	
provisional	conclusion	can	be	drawn:	“Legitimate	social	norms	are	only	those	in	which	all	the	parties	
involved	can	participate	in	a	deliberation,	and	be	convinced	of	and	agree	upon.”
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In	this	manner,	when	discussion	following	the	above	formal	conditions	is	conducted	while	meeting	
this	substantive	condition,	an	ideal	type	of	the	most	abstract	deliberative	democracy	is	established.	
(There	 is	an	argument	by	which	the	deliberation	principle	 is	defined	as	“the	only	norm	that	 is	
capable	 of	 finding	 an	 agreement	 from	all	 the	 parties	 concerned	 as	 participants	 in	 practical	
deliberation	 can	 demand	validity,”	stipulating	 the	 specialization	 to	 its	moral	 principle	 as	 a	
universalizability	principle,	thus	placing	the	principle	of	deliberation	side	by	side	with	the	principle	
of	democracy	(Habermas	1996:	41;	1991:	138-140).		However,	it	is	obvious	that,	once	referring	to	
the	provisional	conclusion	above,	deliberative	democracy	is	a	common	higher	principle	among	any	
deliberative	type.)
2　Deliberative Democratic Politics
As	long	as	there	are	conflicts	and	feuds	universally,	and	problem	solving	and	behavior	modification	
through	dialogue	are	required,	deliberative	democracy	is	needed	in	organizations	of	any	nature	and	
on	any	scale	(though	its	extent	varies).		We	can	list	numerous	specific	examples:	on	a	global	scale,	
those	organizations	are	the	United	Nations	(UN)	and	its	various	organs	and	conferences	(such	as	the	
U.N.	General	Assembly,	the	World	Conference	on	Women,	the	International	Conferences	on	the	
Environment,	and	the	World	Conference	on	Human	Rights),	the	International	Court	of	Justice	(ICJ),	
the	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC),	the	World	Social	Forum,	and	the	International	Conference	
for	a	Global	Ban	on	Anti-Personnel	Landmines;	on	a	regional	scale,	they	are	the	European	Union	
(EU),	the	Association	of	Southeast	Asian	Nations	(ASEAN),	and	the	African	Conference;	there	are	
other	organization	on	a	nation-state	or	municipal	scale,	not	to	mention	neighborhood	associations	
and	nonprofits	(NPOs)	(Bohman	2010:	Gastil/Levine	2005;	Yasue	2007;	Shinohara	1994).		Here,	we	
limit	the	stage	to	“nation-states”	with	a	liberal-democratic	political	system.		The	reason	is	that	we	
believe	that	the	importance	of	the	political	unit	of	nation-state	will	never	be	lost	no	matter	how	state	
sovereignty	is	distributed,	externally	(international	and	regional	unions,	international	treaties)	and	
internally	(“decentralization”),	and	how	much	that	trend	will	develop	in	the	future.		In	particular,	
considering	that	Japan	currently	 faces	urgent	and	critical	national	 issues	(for	 instance,	the	post-
quake	recovery	and	reconstruction,	the	nuclear	power	plant	accident,	the	Futenma	U.S.	Base,	the	
Trans-Pacific	Partnership	(TPP)	agreement,	and	budget	deficits).		Despite	this,	those	issues	are	not	
on	the	agenda	for	national	discussion;	therefore,	conversely,	deliberative	democratic	politics	is	most	
urgently	sought	by	the	citizens	of	Japan.		(Some	say	that	in	the	daily	and	fixed	process	of	decision	
forming	and	making,	where	there	are	only	a	few	or	hardly	any	conflicts	or	feuds,	we	do	not	need	
deliberative	democratic	politics	 in	the	 first	place.	 	They	are	wrong.	 	 It’s	because	even	 in	those	
cases,	we	need	 to	continue	 to	question	 the	reasons	 for	 the	decision	and	ask	what	 the	“better	
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reasons”	are.)
(1) Fundamental Problems in the Political Decision-Forming and -Making Process (Indirect 
Equal Participation)
< Liberal Democratic Politics >　The	most	 important	 ideal	 in	 liberal	democratic	politics	
consists	of	three	points:	
First, the Respect and Realization of Human Rights: human	rights	are	the	rights	human	beings	
possess	 innately	and	universally,	 logically	preceding	society	and	politics,	and	we	are	required	to	
respect	and	realize	those	rights	to	the	fullest.	 	(This	 is	because,	 in	reality,	 inequality,	oppression	
and	exclusion	 remain	 the	dominant	problems.)	 	Human	rights	are,	quite	generally	 speaking,	
centered	on	the	right	to	subjective	freedom	(they	are	commonly	called	civil	rights,	such	as	human	
dignity	and	inherent	value,	the	inviolability	of	individual	lives,	bodies,	and	freedoms,	the	freedoms	
of	thought,	belief,	conscience,	and	religion,	the	freedoms	of	speech,	expression,	and	the	press,	the	
freedom	of	assembly	and	association,	the	 freedom	of	choice	 in	employment,	and	the	 freedom	of	
property	rights).
Second, the Parliamentary Representation System by Universal Suffrage (Equal Rights of 
Political Participation):	the	law	and	power	necessary	to	guarantee	human	rights	must	be	organized	
by	the	people.		(Otherwise,	arbitrary	autocracy	cannot	be	eliminated.)		In	other	words,	only	when	
the	people	organize	a	system	that	they	administer	themselves	does	that	that	system	have	legitimacy	
(the	popular	sovereignty	principle).		This	system	is	embodied	in	the	composition	of	a	parliament	by	
universal	suffrage,	followed	by	policy	making	by	the	parliament	and	the	enactment	of	law,	and,	the	
legislative,	executive,	and	judiciary	organization	by	statutory	law	(the	principle	of	state	by	the	rule	
of	 law).	 	To	rephrase,	normally,	the	people	as	sovereign	can	exercise	their	sovereignty	only	by	
indirect	representation	of	themselves	(parliamentary	sovereignty;	however,	this	 is	complemented	
by	the	right	to	direct	participation	such	as	through	national	referenda	and	the	right	to	petition).	
Additionally,	policy	making	in	the	parliament	and	statutory	law	bind	the	administration	and	at	the	
same	time,	the	judiciary	branch	is	independent	of	the	legislative	and	the	executive	(the	separation	of	
three	branches	of	government).
Third, Guarantee of Social Rights:	In	order	to	substantively	realize	human	rights	and	the	equal	
rights	to	political	participation	as	opposed	to	retaining	them	in	name	only,	social	rights	such	as	the	
right	 to	exist	 and	 the	 right	 to	work	must	be	guaranteed	 to	everyone	 regardless	of	political,	
economic,	social,	and	cultural	 inequalities,	and	oppression	and	exclusion	 (United	Nations	The	
Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights).
However,	the	liberal	democratic	politics	 in	reality	shows	that	first,	politicians,	representing	the	
people,	are	strongly	bound	by	the	special	interests	of	their	constituents	and	elected	organizations	(if	
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they	aren’t,	it	is	highly	likely	that	they	will	not	be	reelected).		They	are	controlled	by	the	executive	
teams	of	certain	 large	political	parties	(normally	two	or	three).	 	Often,	those	parties	are	tied	to	
special	 interest	 groups	 and	 trade	organizations,	 particularly	 the	economic	power	 (i.e.,	 the	
independent	market	economic	system).	 	 (The	goals	and	driving	force	of	the	economic	power	are	
capital	accumulation	and	the	maximizing	of	private	earnings.)	 	 	Second,	the	parliament,	which	 is	
supposed	to	assume	policy	making	and	the	enactment	of	laws,	has	its	legislative	power	restricted	by	
ballooning	administrative	power	(the	independent	administrative	system	consisting	of	bureaucracy	
and	 government).	 	 (It	 is	 overwhelmingly	 common	 that	 government	 proposals	 initiated	 by	
bureaucracy	become	statutory	law.)		Also,	administrative	power	is	strongly	influenced	by	economic	
power	 (Habermas	1973).　Third,	consequently,	social	power	groups,	particularly	 the	political	
system	led	by	administrative	power,	which	prioritizes	the	economic	power’s	interests,	increasingly	
tend	to	convert	 the	parliament	 into	not	an	organ	of	 free	deliberation	but	a	bargaining	organ	to	
compromise	interests	and	make	deals.		Fourth,	for	this	reason,	the	primary	task	for	political	parties	
and	politicians	is	to	acquire	positions	in	the	government,	the	core	of	administrative	power	(power	
struggle	 through	 interparty	competition),	and	 to	do	so,	 set	 the	goal	of	gaining	parliamentary	
majority.		To	obtain	the	majority	support	of	their	constituents,	they	have	to	appeal	to	their	private	
interests,	preferences,	and	values.	 	On	the	other	hand,	they	also	cannot	help	but	appeal	 to	the	
policies	of	interests	“representing	all	the	people”	as	well	as	the	personalities	with	values	embodying	
those	 interests.	 	 (Politicians	who	fixate	only	on	personal	greed	and	partisan	 interests	are	highly	
likely	to	meet	with	election	defeat.)	 	 	This	 is	the	dilemma	of	politicians.	 	Finally,	faced	with	such	
realities,	 it	 is	only	natural	and	quite	understandable	that	many	citizens	lose	faith	in	politicians	and	
the	parliament	as	well	as	administrative	power;	they	harbor	a	sense	of	distrust,	and	grow	apathetic	
toward	politics	itself,	or	end	up	abandoning	the	right	to	political	participation.
< The Dilemma of Parliamentary Sovereignty >
Now,	what	do	we	need	to	attain	the	aforementioned	ideal	in	this	reality?		We	need	to	revert	to	the	
fundamentals	of	political	decision	forming	and	making.
No	matter	what	one	thinks	of	the	nature	of	politics,	politics,	in	regards	to	any	problem	involving	
society	on	the	whole,	requires	one	to	come	up	with	and	decide	on	a	policy	to	resolve	the	problem	
based	on	understanding	and	judgment,	presumed	to	be	neutral	and	fair,	and	it	requires	one	to	decide	
and	enforce	that	policy	in	the	form	of	statutory	law.		To	expand	it	a	 little,	a	problem	that	can	be	
resolved	in	a	partial	society	(e.g.	local	government)	or	a	subgroup	(e.g.	the	family)	is	not	subject	to	
politics.		(Of	course,	we	cannot	prophetically	determine	what	a	problem	involving	society	as	a	whole	
is.		The	issue	of	Minamata	Disease	(mercury	poisoning)	was	initially	considered	a	local	problem,	and	
the	issue	of	domestic	violence	used	to	be	handled	as	a	family	problem.		What	should	be	subject	to	
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politics	will	be	greatly	affected	by	the	 ideal	ways	of	social	movements	and	associations,	or	 the	
process	of	forming	multivocal	public	opinion.)			Also,	if	the	policy	is	determined	by	partisan	or	non-
universalizable	 interests,	 it	 is	 self-evident	 that	 its	 legitimacy	cannot	be	argued.	 	Therefore,	
“Statutory	 law	also	 ideally	prescribes	an	 issue	while	equally	considering	the	 interests	of	all	 the	
parties	 involved	and,	within	that	extent,	expresses	the	universalizable	 interests	(Habermas	1998:	
191).		Furthermore,	unless	it	does	not	take	the	form	of	statutory	law,	the	arbitrary	control	by	the	
administrative	power	that	implements	policies	cannot	be	eliminated.
The	most	important	aspect	in	political	decision	forming	and	making	is	the	condition	to	realize	the	
formation	and	decision	of	fair	policies	and	law.		In	other	words,	it	is	about	clarifying	specific	forms	to	
practice	deliberative	democratic	politics.	 	This	 is	because,	 in	many	cases,	political	 issues	to	be	
topicalized	have	conflicting	understanding,	judgment	and	opinions,	thus	are	likely	to	be	a	target	of	
controversy	due	to	the	diverse	nature	of	those	issues.		(When	goals	are	shared,	an	instrumentally	
rational	deliberation,	by	which	the	optimum	method	 is	chosen,	 is	sufficient;	but	when	common	
interests	and	values	are	the	points	of	contention,	a	political	deliberation	(in	the	narrow	sense)	to	
pursue	universalizable	interests	and	values	to	the	fullest	extent	will	be	necessary;	when	verifying	
the	consistency	of	 the	 legal	system,	a	 legal	deliberation	will	be	requested;	 in	the	case	of	moral	
issues	that	should	be	valid	to	all	people,	the	most	strict	deliberation	will	be	required	(Habermas	
1998:	206-207).)		We	can	assume	four	stage	settings	linked	closely	to	each	other.
The	 first	 stage	 is	 the	 institutionalized	process	of	 forming	and	making	decisions,	 such	as	a	
parliament	and	its	committees,	a	government	ministry	or	agency	and	its	council,	as	well	as	a	court;	
however,	one	definition	that	most	strictly	prescribes	the	“procedure	of	an	ideal	deliberation”	is	the	
following	definition	 (Cohen	1997:	74-75;	Habermas	1998:	370-371).	 	 (Yet,	even	using	the	same	
phrase	of	 legitimation	through	procedure,	this	completely	differs	from	that	 in	systems	theory,	by	
which	deliberation	subjects	are	completely	excluded.		“The	point	of	legitimation	by	procedure	is	to	
have	 the	 concerned	party	 isolated	 as	 the	 root	 source	 of	 the	 issue	 and	 render	 social	 order	
independent	 from	its	agreement	or	refusal	 	 (Luhmann	1983:	121).”)	 	①	Every	person	who	may	
possibly	be	 influenced	by	the	decision	has	an	equal	opportunity	to	participate	and	engage	 in	the	
deliberation;	②	All	participants	are	equal.	 	They	will	all	 follow	the	deliberation	rules	and	may	
present	reasons	for	the	subject,	solution,	and	consent	or	refusal	at	any	stage.		They	also	have	the	
equal	right	 to	make	a	decision;	any	 inequality	 in	real	power,	resource,	and	 information	will	be	
excluded;	③	Deliberation	 is	conducted	 in	a	demonstrative	 format.	 	The	participants	can	 freely	
present	suggestions	and	the	reasons	 for	criticism	regarding	any	 issue	assumed	to	be	related	to	
society	 as	 a	whole.	 	 In	 that	 case,	no	power	other	 than	 the	“better	 reasons	presumed	 to	be	
universalizable”	will	 be	enforced.	 	The	participants	will	 be	bound	only	by	 the	 results	of	 the	
deliberation;	④	Deliberation	will	aim	to	form	agreement	by	rational	motivation,	that	 is	to	say,	a	
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reason	or	reasons	that	will	satisfy	and	convince	all	the	parties	concerned.	 	However,	due	to	time	
restrictions,	it	is	often	difficult	to	form	a	“common	argument	and	reason”	in	political,	legal	and	moral	
deliberations	and	conflict	and	feud	may	intensify;	for	this	reason,	majority	rule	has	to	be	adopted.		In	
that	case,	three	conditions	need	to	be	met:	a)	The	decision	by	the	majority	is	regarded	merely	as	a	
“provisionally”	legitimate	decision	until	the	minority	may	convince	the	majority.	 	The	decision	 is	
revisable	since	it	may	possibly	be	wrong	or	its	social	and	historical	conditions	may	possibly	change	
(Habermas	1998:	613);		b)	The	minority	is	institutionally	guaranteed	equal	opportunity	participation	
and	engagement	(such	as	the	equal	opportunity	to	comment	and	record	disclosure);	and	c)	Especially	
in	 the	case	of	majority	 rule	by	compromise,	which	 is	extremely	common	 in	 reality,	“All	 the	
stakeholders	are	guaranteed	the	equal	opportunity	to	participate	in	a	negotiation	to	compromise,	
and	given	an	equal	opportunity	to	practice	influence	each	other	during	the	negotiation,	therefore,	in	
general,	are	also	provided	the	opportunity	to	realize	all	related	interests.			As	long	as	compromise	is	
made	while	 following	such	a	procedure,	the	 inference	that	the	agreement	reached	 is	 fair	can	be	
established	(Habermas	1998:	205-206).”		(Although	Habermas	distinguishes	political	deliberation	
from	compromise,	 it	 lacks	a	convincing	explanation.	 	A	 fair	compromise	 is	still	 the	second	best	
policy	when	no	agreement	has	been	reached.);	and	finally,	the	process	of	deliberating	and	decision	
making	 is	 released	 to	 the	 people,	 the	mass	media,	 and	 journalists;	 therefore,	 records	 and	
information	necessary	 for	 fair	 understanding	 and	 judging	 is	 disclosed,	 and	 if	 requested,	 an	
explanation	will	be	made.
The	parliament	and	politicians,	on	one	hand,	have	no	choice	but	to	make	efforts	to	respond	to	
those	requests.		Above	all,	since	the	process	of	deliberating	and	making	policies	and	laws,	as	well	as	
the	comments	they	have	made	in	the	parliament	are	already	disclosed	to	the	people,	however	partial	
or	unilateral,	 these	are	subject	 to	 the	people’s	 interest,	supervision,	verification	and	criticism.	
Also,	we	cannot	completely	 ignore	 the	results	of	“opinion	polls,”	an	accumulation	of	personal	
judgments	and	opinions	of	the	people.		In	addition,	as	“the	representatives	of	all	the	citizens”	who	
make	(or	are	able	to	make)	fair	judgments	by	equally	weighing	the	public	interest,	as	well	as	experts	
with	knowledge	 and	 information	 far	more	 abundant	 than	 that	 of	 the	 public,	 as	 opposed	 to	
representing	certain	special	interests,	they	may	have	pride	and	a	sense	of	responsibility.		But	on	the	
other	hand,	as	previously	mentioned,	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	 there	have	been	rampant	cases	of	
majority	rule,	power	struggles,	and	compromise	and	deal-making,	surrounded	by	the	overwhelming	
power	 of	 the	 independent	 system	 of	 the	 market	 economy	 and	 the	 administrative	 system.	
Furthermore,	almost	all	politicians	have	become	the	“privileged	class”	in	terms	of	power,	position,	
assets,	knowledge,	and	 information;	they	have	 lost	touch	with	the	 judgment	and	opinions	of	the	
public,	occasionally	ignoring	or	denying	the	“will	of	the	people.”		The	dilemma	of	the	parliamentary	
sovereignty	is	this:	the	former	(the	people)	and	the	latter	(politicians)	frequently	battle	against	each	
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other	and	the	weight	tends	to	lean	toward	the	latter.		(This	trend	is	conspicuous	when	social	issues	
that	should	have	been	topicalized	as	political	 issues	 in	the	first	place	are	 ignored,	which	will	be	
examined	in	the	next	section.)			In	order	to	promote	the	formulation	and	adoption	of	fair	policies	and	
laws	against	this	trend,	we	must	strengthen	the	political	participation	by	the	people	who	exercise	
influence	upon	the	parliament	and	politicians	(or	the	administration	and	the	court).	 	 (Here,	the	
exercise	of	influence	means	to	obtain	“understanding	and	agreement”	through	speech,	and	it	differs	
completely	from	“control,”	a	form	of	the	use	of	power,	which	is	actually	completely	opposite	to	it.)	
And	that	 is	rightfully	required	under	the	principle	of	popular	sovereignty.	 	Next,	 the	circuit	 to	
enhance	participation	is	the	second	stage	setting	called	the	formation	of	multivocal	public	opinion.		
(2) The Process and Function of Forming Multivocal Public Opinions (Indirect Deliberative 
Participation)
< Social Movement, Association, and Civic Society >
The	two	systems,	the	independent	market	economy	and	the	administration,	have	also	controlled	
the	family-centered	lifeworld	(Fig.	1).	 	This	trend	became	conspicuous	from	the	beginning	of	the	
twentieth	century	in	Europe	and	North	America	and	the	1960s	in	Japan	(Particularly,	as	the	new	
liberal	market	economy	and	nationalistic	government	made	further	progress	since	the	1990s,	their	
control	grew.		As	the	transfer	of	finance,	capital,	labor,	services,	and	information	further	progressed	
on	a	global	scale,	super-nation-state	and	corporation-oriented	policies,	symbolized	by	non-regular	
employment	and	deregulation,	were	implemented;	welfare	and	social	security	were	reduced	while	
government-oriented	policies,	represented	by	privatization,	were	enhanced.)	 	As	a	result,	“New	
conflicts	will	occur	at	the	contact	points	between	the	system	and	the	lifeworld	(Habermas	1981:	581;	
Honneth/Jaeggi	1980:	261-269).”		In	other	words,	in	addition	to	the	“old	conflicts”	represented	by	
capital	vs.	 labor,	 imperialism	vs.	colonies,	we	have	seen	an	emergence	of	“new	types	of	conflict	
based	on	new	values,”	such	as	antinuclear	and	peace	vs.	military	expansion,	anti-pollution	and	
environmental	protection	vs.	economic	growth	and	development,	women’s	liberation	vs.	patriarchy,	
the	minority	(race,	religion,	the	disabled,	homosexuals,	and	the	elderly)	vs.	the	majority,	subculture	
vs.	culture	 industry,	decentralization	vs.	centralization,	youth	 inclusion	vs.	exclusion,	consumer	
(living	person)	“sovereignty”	vs.	production-and-supply	 initiative,	and	antinuclear	power	vs.	
“peaceful	use	of	nuclear	power”	(Eder	1988:	256-282)	 (Fig.2).	On	 top	of	 that,	 those	conflicts	
stemmed	 from	anxiety	and	 fear,	disappointment	and	anger,	as	well	as	 resistance	of	 individual	
persons	 (For	 instance,	change	 in	 the	social	conscience	 that	began	with	 the	Chernobyl	nuclear	
meltdown	as	a	turning	point	was	not	necessarily	caused	 just	by	the	existing	political	parties	and	
peace	organizations;	it	was	also	supported	by	the	wide-ranging,	simple,	yet	responsive	sensitivities	
of	child-rearing	women.		Those	who	opposed	food	additives	and	genetically	modified	food	were	the	
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same	(Meinberg	1990:	148-159).		Also,	the	antinuclear	and	peace	movement	originated	in	the	anger	
of	Suginami-ward	housewives	who	protested	the	radiation	exposure	of	the	5th	Fukuryu-maru	boat	in	
the	U.S.	hydrogen-bomb	test	off	the	Bikini	Atoll,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	its	victims	decided	to	put	
their	experiences	into	words	(Kurihara	2011).)	 	But,	those	events	were	not	recognized	by	society	
(or	the	public)	from	the	beginning.		On	the	contrary,	they	were	criticized,	ignored,	and	denied	as	
minority	opinions.
Now	then,	regardless	of	 the	age	of	conflicts,	 in	order	 for	a	“social	 issue”	to	be	 	discovered,	
recognized	and	topicalized,	deliberated	based	on	proper	information	and	reasons,	and	consequently,	
helping	shape	plural	public	opinions,	and	discussed	at	a	venue	of	political	decision-forming	and	
making	a	policy	and	then	be	enacted,	the	following	subjective	and	semi-institutional	conditions	and	
developmental	process	are	necessary	(edited	from	Habermas	1981:	435-443).
①　	The	parties	concerned	and	related	present	an	issue,	which	they	subjectively	feel	and	believe	
should	be	resolved	by	society	as	a	whole,	as	individuals	or	a	private	group	(via	a	discussion	with	
family,	friends,	acquaintances,	fellow	members	or	fellow	volunteers).		(Often,	the	turning	point	
comes	when	the	media	and	 journalists	discover	 the	 issue.	 	Here,	we	assume	that	 it	begin	
through	daily	communication	by	private	citizens	of	 the	 lifeworld.)	 	However,	 in	order	 to	
generate	feedback	and	responses,	especially	to	be	recognized	by	the	media	and	journalists,	it	is	
necessary	to	adopt	a	continuous	presentation	of	issues	and	diverse	methods	of	expression	(such	
as	events,	assemblies,	study	and	discussion	groups,	advertising	and	petition	campaigns	on	the	
Figure 1　correlation between system and life world from the perspective of system
political system
（Habermas 1981：473）
administrative
system
parliament court
decided
policy
loyalty
beneﬁt
tax
 
 
votes
recipient
employee
consumer
lifeworld
labor force
wage
demand
goods/service
m
arket
enterprise 
m
arket econom
y system
 
pressure
65
Normative	Theory,	Deliberative	Democratic	Politics,	and	Associations
streets,	demonstrations,	the	publication	of	brochures	and	documents,	research	reports,	and	
policy	presentations),	which	will	be	premised	on	the	dual	organization	of	time	and	space,	i.e.,	
development	as	a	social	movement	and	the	formation	of	an	association	at	 its	core.		And	since	
each	of	the	issues	to	be	tropicalized	has	 individuality	and	independence	as	the	starting	point,	
both	the	social	movement	and	association,	and	the	participating	actors,	are	characterized	by	
independence	and	autonomy.		At	the	same	time,	 if	both	the	social	movement	and	association	
have	a	broader	social	expanse	 in	activity,	 it	 is	highly	 likely	that	their	mutual	affiliation	and	
networking	will	develop	further.	 	 (For	example,	since	Fukushima,	the	hibakusha	(victims	of	
radiation	exposure)	movement	and	the	Japan	Confederation	of	Atomic-	and	Hydrogen-Bomb	
Sufferers	Organizations,	began	to	clearly	emphasize	the	homogeneity	in	nuclear	weapons	and	
nuclear	 power	 plants,	 namely	“the	 peaceful	 use	 of	 nuclear	 energy,”	 contributing	 to	
Figure 2　correlation between system and life world from the perspective of lifeworld
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synchronizing	 the	 antinuclear	 peace	movement	 and	 antinuclear	 power	plant	movement	
(Kurihara	2011).	)	
To	define	an	association	based	on	or	affiliated	with	social	movements	most	generally,	we	have	five	
characteristics	(compiled	and	edited	from	Sato	2007;	Kasuya	2007;	Habermas	1992:	Salamon	1999):	
It	is	a	voluntary	organization	with	citizens’	free	will	and	voluntary	nature	(including	the	freedom	of	
withdrawal);	 it	 is	an	organization	 independent	from	the	government	or	corporation;	 its	goal	 is	to	
realize	the	common	good	and	public	benefits	needed	by	society	(such	as	welfare	and	social	services,	
medical	care	and	health,	education,	the	environment,	and	human	rights)	as	opposed	to	pursuing	
private	benefits,	or	particularly	being	profit-oriented	(even	when	conducting	commercial	activity,	
there	will	be	no	dividends	for	the	joint	investors	or	limited	to	a	certain	level	or	lower);	its	members	
have	equal	authority	and	decisions	are	made	and	management	is	carried	out	through	participation	
and	deliberation	(Democratic	self-rule.		In	the	case	of	a	co-op,	it	is	expressed	as	“joint”	investment,	
labor,	decision-making,	management,	and	operation);	and	its	organizational	principles	and	medium	
are	not	power	and	money,	but	solidarity,	cooperation	and	dialogue.
The	specific	form	of	association	widely	varies,	as	in	the	NPO,	international	NPO,	labor	union,	co-
op,	mutual-aid	association,	foundation,	fund,	research	organization,	policy-recommendation	group,	
volunteer	group,	and	self-help	group.		Needless	to	say,	those	associations	are	also	at	risk	of	losing	
the	above	characteristics,	especially	the	deliberative	democratic	nature,	due	to	their	tendency	to	be	
large-scale	and	to	expand	commercial	activity,	and	governmental	 intervention	(funding,	control).	
Thus,	in	addition	to	the	dialogue	and	checking	between	associations,	they	need	external	checking	
(by	the	government,	labor	union,	or	other	civic	activities)	as	well	as	internal	check	(on	the	degree	of	
freedom	in	participation	and	withdrawal,	democratic	operation,	and	external	accountability)	(Warren	
2000:	207-210).
At	the	same	time,	there	are	organizations	that	compete	with	those	associations.		They	are	mostly	
political	parties,	political	associations,	entrepreneur	groups,	and	trade	organizations	 (Habermas	
2008:	171).	 	Therefore,	associations,	while	debating	and	fighting	against	competing	organizations,	
perform	their	activity	to	seek	social	recognition	and	approval.		Such	a	social	relationship	is	behind	
the	civic	society	going	against	 the	political	 system	and	 the	market	economy	system	(Fig.	3).	
“Existing	at	the	institutional	core	of	civic	society	are	non-government,	non-economic	joint	groups	
and	associations	based	on	free	will;	consequently,	the	communicative	structure	of	the	public	sphere	
is	 rooted	 in	 the	social	components	of	 the	 lifeworld.	 	Civic	society	 is	made	up	of	associations,	
organizations,	and	movements,	voluntarily	founded	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent.		Those	joint	groups	
will	 lead	to	a	political	public	sphere	while	taking	up	sympathy	and	empathy,	found	in	problematic	
circumstances	in	the	realm	of	private	life,	and	condensing	or	magnifying	them.		The	core	of	civic	
society	 is	 an	association	 that	 institutionalizes	 a	problem-solving	deliberation	 into	an	 issue	of	
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universal	interests	within	the	limit	of	that	public	sphere	(Habermas	1998:	443).
②　	The	Mass	Media,	 Journalism,	the	Formation	of	Multivocal	Public	Opinion,	and	a	Triple-
Function	Circuit
The	mass	media	and	journalism	play	an	extremely	large	role	in	new	and	old	“social	issues”	being	
socially	recognized	and	topicalized.		(Although	social	media	also	plays	a	major	role	with	its	ability	to	
dig	up,	transmit	and	propagate	information,	it	has	such	issues	as	literacy	gap,	the	lack	or	weakness	
Figure 3　association, civil society, public sphere, public discourse, system
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of	accountability,	and	 fragmented	and	one-sided	data.)	 	The	media,	 in	particular,	 is	by	 far	 the	
strongest	 in	terms	of	diversity,	extension,	and	power	of	 influence.		Yet,	the	following	issues	have	
been	pointed	out	(Habermas	2008:	158-161,	174-175).			Whether	the	media	is	independent	from	both	
the	political	and	market-economy	system	(The	 lack	of	 independence	 is	reflected	 in	 the	media’s	
response	to	the	nuclear	energy	policy	of	the	government	and	corporations	since	1954.);	whether	the	
media	and	 journalists	manipulate	 their	 topicalization	and	reportage	 in	an	arbitrary	and	power-
wielding	manner	(proved	by	the	reporting	of	the	50,000-Participant	Antinuclear	Power	Plant	Rally	
on	September	19,	2011.);	whether	the	media,	 in	discussion	programs	regarding	highly	conflicting	
issues,	take	measures	to	contribute	to	fair	recognition	and	judgment	of	the	viewers	and	listeners	
(Accurately	established	 subjects	 and	 issues,	 a	 fair	 representation	of	 participants,	 the	equal	
opportunity	to	comment,	the	presentation	of	accurate	facts	and	information,	and	the	respecting	and	
complying	with	dialogue	format).		
③　	The	last	point	 is	decidedly	 important	 in	two	respects.	 	This	 is	because	there	are	definitely	
gaps	 in	knowledge	and	 information	and	unequal	abilities	of	expression	and	dialogue	among	
most	participants	appearing	 in	the	media	(panel	discussion	programs)	(such	as	 journalists,	
politicians,	 experts,	 association	 representatives,	 opposed	group	 representatives,	 and	
occasionally	viewers’	representatives);	 it	 is	 thus	necessary	to	“invalidate”	that	realistic	
inequality	of	power.	 	This	 is	because	the	participants	need	to	make	 fair	recognition	and	
judgment,	no	matter	how	difficult,	to	get	as	close	as	possible	to	the	aforementioned	“ideal	
deliberation	procedure.”		This	is	practically	the	same	in	the	case	of	interviews	or	debates	in	
papers	and	magazines,	and	open	discussions	(forum	and	symposium).		However,	in	reality,	it	
is	difficult	to	meet	those	two	conditions.			That	is	because,	in	addition	to	temporal	and	spatial	
restrictions	(the	limited	broadcast,	airtime,	and	article	space	in	papers	and	magazines)	and	
the	difficulty	of	a	continuous	systematic	pursuit	(single	shot),	the	bias	of	the	participants	is	
unavoidable	in	the	first	place.
We	cannot	immediately	judge	whether	those	deliberations	can	influence	the	viewers	and	readers	
in	shaping	their	opinions.		On	one	hand,	it	has	been	pointed	out	that	political	discussions	have	turned	
into	entertainment,	their	influence	on	civic	society	and	lifeworld	no	longer	functions,	and	apathy	and	
private	 life-oriented,	self-centered	 lifestyles	are	widely	promoted.	 	On	the	other	hand,	 it	 is	said,	
“Unconsciously	.	.	.	we	will	begin	to	adopt	a	rational	position	on	political	subjects	(Habermas	2008:	
185-188,	179).”		Particularly,	 influence	on	associations	and	social	movements	and	the	 interaction	
between	the	two	and	deliberation	remain	uncertain.		But,	there	are	several	cases	in	which,	due	to	
the	media’s	 topicalization,	conflicting	opinions	were	released	 in	a	civic	society,	revitalizing	the	
activity	of	associations	and	social	movements,	and	consequently,	local	or	topical	deliberations	have	
begun.		(Recent	debates	are	over	whether	the	Futenma	U.S.	Base	should	be	relocated	to	Henoko	or	
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outside	Okinawa	Prefecture,	whether	the	construction	of	the	Yanba	Dam	is	right	or	wrong,	the	
continuation	or	suspension/decommissioning	of	nuclear	power	plants,	and	participation	in	the	TPP.	
The	formation	of	citizens’	opinions	by	the	media	and	its	influence	on	social	movements	have	been	
analyzed	in	detail	(Ito	2005:	211-258;	Kobayashi	2007).		Function	analyses	on	local	media,	different	
from	the	mass	media,	and	journalism	are	also	beneficial.)		Of	course,	at	this	point,	we	are	far	from	
“the	formation	of	public	opinion	through	a	self-reflection	[called	deliberation].”		To	be	able	to	do	
this,	we	need	the	premise	of	presenting	“a	more	or	 less	consistent	set	of	conflicting	opinions	of	
agreement	and	denial,	which	are	opinions	related	 to	 important	subjects,	and	plural	opinions	 to	
express	most	convincing	and	best	reasoned	interpretations	considering	available	information,	as	well	
as	 interpretations	of	crucial,	yet	commonly	unresolved	 issues	 (Habermas	2008:	171-172).”		 In	
addition,	there	exist	opinions	of	varied	degrees	of	rational	nature	in	the	opinion	formation	process	
for	each	of	the	arguments,	for	and	against.		On	top	disputed	subjects	can	vary	widely,	and	“public”	
opinion,	as	formed	by	citizens’	deliberations,	have	no	choice	but	to	become	multivocal	 in	a	triple	
sense.
There	are	three	circuits	for	such	multivocal	opinions	to	function:	the	exercise	of	influence	on	the	
aforementioned	civic	society	and	 lifeworld,	 the	 influence	on	voting	behavior	through	 it,	and	the	
influence	on	 the	political	 system	 (the	parliament,	 administration,	 and	court)	 and	 the	market	
economy	system	(corporations	and	markets)	(Fig.	4).	 	As	revealed	in	the	 issues	of	the	Minamata	
Disease	and	HIV-tainted	blood	products,	movements	and	public	opinion	can	certainly	change	the	
public	opinion	of	 lifeworld,	 as	well	 as	 the	administrative	 system	and	corporations,	enabling	
legislation	by	the	parliament.	 	And	the	administrative	system,	bound	by	statute,	will	change	the	
current	state	of	the	 lifeworld.	 	In	that	sense,	social	movements,	associations,	and	public	opinion	
have	a	significant	role	in	political	decision-making,	which	is	presumed	to	be	fair	judgment,	as	well	as	
for	the	administrative	system	and	the	ideal	state	of	the	lifeworld.		With	a	focus	on	the	relationship	
between	public	opinion,	the	parliament,	and	the	administrative	system,	 it	can	be	summarized	as	
follows:	“The	[popular]	sovereignty,	 fluidized	 in	a	communicative	manner,	gains	validity	 in	 the	
power	[Directly	quoted.	Deliberation	is	not	power.]	of	open	discussion	[pubic	opinion].		This	open	
discussion	will	discover	crucial	subjects	to	society	as	a	whole,	interpret	various	values,	contribute	
to	problem	solving,	generate	reliable	reasons,	and	dismiss	wrong	reasons.		Of	course,	such	opinions	
must	 take	the	shape	of	 the	decision	of	a	democratically	organized	group	 [parliament].	 	That	 is	
because	 the	 responsibility	 of	 practically	 effective	 decisions	 requires	 institutional	 liability.	
Deliberation	 is	not	about	controlling;	 it	 is	about	generating	a	communicative	power	 [called	 the	
parliament].	 	 [Directly	quoted.	 	Deliberation	can	merely	enforce	 influence	on	the	parliament	and	
does	not	and	should	not	generate	any	power.]	 	And	this	power	can	only	exert	 influence	on	the	
administrative	power	and	cannot	replace	 it.	 	This	 influence	 is	 limited	to	procuring	or	depriving	
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legitimation.		Communicative	power	appeals	to	state	bureaucracy	“in	the	form	of	surrounding	it,”	
but	 cannot	 be	 replaced	with	 its	 systemic	 characteristics	 [Yet,	 it	 can	 change	 the	 system’s	
organizational	form	and	the	way	it	functions	(Habermas	1990:	44).
Nonetheless,	on	the	other	hand,	there	are	three	limitations	to	multivocal	public	opinion.		First,	
because	of	the	strong	power	of	both	systems	and	opposing	groups,	its	influence	on	decision	forming	
and	making	 in	the	parliament	 is	 limited,	and	 its	effectiveness	 is	rather	weak	within	that	extent.	
Second,	since	participants	in	social	movements	and	associations	are	a	minority	in	society,	and	thus,	
multivocal	public	opinion	cannot	completely	sweep	off	the	arbitrary	and	authoritative	attitude	of	the	
media	and	journalists.		Third,	therefore,	it	is	not	necessarily	true	that	public	opinion	is	formed	via	
the	selection	of	“better	reasoning”	through	the	presentation	of	arguments	 for	and	against,	cross	
examination,	and	deliberation,	embodying	the	content	presumed	to	be	fair	and	rational	recognition	
and	 judgment.	 	Hence,	 the	challenge	 to	 those	 limitations	 is	 the	 third	 stage	setting,	namely,	
“deliberative	mini-publics	or	microcosmos.”
(3) “Deliberative Mini-Publics and Microcosmos” (Indirect Equal Participation of 
Representatives)
There	have	been	numerous	examples	of	this	(Ogawa	2007;	Shinohara	1994;	Gastil/Levine	2005).	
We	will	examine	this	stage	based	on	the	“deliberative	opinion	poll”	(Fishkin	2005:	2009),	whose	
theoretical	 foundation	 is	reliable	and	whose	practical	cases	are	copious	 in	the	world	 including	 in	
China,	while	adding	several	supplementary	notes	and	revisions	from	other	examples	(particularly	
Mervile	2005:	37-58).
①　A	random	sample	of	300	to	several	million	representatives	will	be	selected
from	the	population	including	those	from	local	governments	to	the	EU.		(To	create	a	“mirror”-like	
population	including	race,	class,	and	gender,	neither	the	self-recommendation	format	nor	allocating	
sampling	as	 in	citizens’	jury	and	consensus	conference	will	not	be	adopted.	 	However,	 layered	
sampling	may	be	used	in	some	cases	to	guarantee	a	representative	selection	of	minority	groups.	By	
random	sampling	only,	 there	may	be	minority	groups	without	possible	selection	and	 it	may	be	
necessary	to	have	plural	representatives	depending	on	the	subject	or	 in	order	to	secure	plural	
representatives	 in	 the	 deliberation	 session	 in	 each	phase.	Sometimes,	 if	 there	 is	 only	 one	
representative	to	make	a	case,	he	or	she	may	not	be	able	to	comment).	 	Each	deliberator	will	be	
paid	 compensation	 ($150	a	day)	 in	 addition	 to	 travel	 and	 accommodation	expenses.	 	 (If	 any	
representative	cannot	participate	 in	the	deliberation	for	a	 financial	reason,	we	cannot	say	that	 it	
represents	the	population.)		A	poll	will	be	conducted	in	advance.	(One	goal	is	to	survey	the	change	
in	preferences	 and	opinions	by	deliberation.	 	Sometimes,	 a	 questionnaire	on	 issues	may	be	
conducted	in	advance.)	 	②	The	representative	will	read	in	advance	the	briefing	document	equally	
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covering	all	the	different	arguments.		③	After	the	plenary	assembly,	the	deliberators	will	move	to	
15-person	group	discussions.		They	will	select	a	foreperson	by	majority	vote.		The	foreperson	must	
strictly	guarantee	to	every	participant	the	equal	opportunity	to	speak.		The	main	objective	of	the	
deliberation	is	to	“reach	an	understanding	representing	a	collective	informed	consent.”		(However,	
since	“requiring	an	agreement	as	a	prerequisite	will	 raise	 the	possibility	 to	generate	a	 false	
consensus	under	social	pressure”	(Mervile	2005:	88),	it	should	be	avoided.		Thus,	it	is	necessary	to	
“sincerely	examine	the	grounds	for	opposing	arguments	in	the	discussion.”		To	do	so,	the	following	
conditions	must	be	met:	a)	“how	much	sufficiently	accurate	information	on	the	dispute	is	given	to	all	
participants;”	b)	“how	much	consideration	by	other	participants	is	given	to	the	argument	presented	
from	one	perspective;”	c)	“how	many	of	various	social	positions	are	expressed	to	the	participants;”	
d)	“how	sincerely	the	participants	examine	the	arguments;”	and	e)	“to	what	extent	the	arguments	
presented	by	all	participants	are	carefully	considered		[without	taking	into	consideration	the	social	
standing	of	 the	participants]”	(Fishkin	2009:	33-34).	 	 (The	reason	why	b)	and	d),	 in	which	 the	
resources	and	attitudes	of	participants	are	more	valued,	should	not	be	prerequisites	for	deliberation	
was	already	pointed	out	 in	Chapter	1.	 	In	addition,	we	need	the	aforementioned	formal	conditions	
and	the	“ideal	deliberation	procedure	to	meet	the	five	conditions;”	so	long	as	forming	an	agreement	
is	the	goal,	definitely,	the	universalizability	principle	must	be	one	of	the	premises.)		If	no	agreement	
is	obtained,	we	select	main	opinions	(plural)	by	a	vote.		(If	an	agreement	is	reached,	this	does	not	
apply.)		④	The	plenary	assembly	foreperson	will	collect	the	opinions	of	all	small	groups	to	create	a	
list	 for	the	plenary	assembly.	 	Afterwards,	a	question	and	answer	session	will	be	conducted	with	
politicians	 (joined	by	experts	and	 journalists	 in	some	cases).	 	The	distribution	of	pro-	and	anti-
opinions	on	the	main	opinions	(plural)	will	be	released.		In	other	words,	the	formation	of	agreement	
is	not	forced	and	majority	rule	is	excluded.		⑤	TV	broadcasting	and	newspaper	reporting	must	be	
conducted.	(Those	who	were	not	selected	to	constitute	the	population	are	still	given	the	opportunity	
to	 learn,	talk	and	think.)	 	⑥	A	post-mortem	survey	will	be	conducted	on	the	representatives	to	
compare	with	①.		
The	most	important	results	were	reported	in	the	following:	“by	the	participation	in	the	dialogue,	
short-term	personal	 interests	were	overcome,	 the	sensitivity	 to	 the	common	good	and	public	
benefits	was	generated	.	.	.			civic	bonds	will	be	revived.”		Many	cases	of	“there	is	certainly	also	the	
influence	on	policy	making,	public	opinion	and	voting	behavior”	were	frequently	pointed	out	(Fishkin	
2009:	135-158;	Ackerman/Fishkin	2003:	21-22).
The	problems	were	①	large	expense,	②	 level	of	 representation,	③	presence	of	continuous	
influence	on	political	preferences	(Wakao	2002:	206-208),		and	④	influence	on	policy	making.		The	
most	important	points	are	②	and	④.		(The	financial	burden	in	①	should	be	“evaluated	in	relation	to	
the	capability	to	obtain	citizens’	agreements	through	deliberation	beyond	the	cost-benefit	analysis”	
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(Wakao	2002:	 26)	 and	 should	 also	 be	 assessed	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 significance	 of	 popular	
participation	on	political	decision-making.		③	is	not	a	problem.		The	fact	that	political	preferences	
can	change	through	deliberation,	especially	based	on	“better	reasons,”	is	far	more	important.		First,	
speaking	of	 the	 level	of	representation,	 the	deliberators	equally	represent	class,	hierarchy,	and	
gender,	and	equality	is	guaranteed	to	each	and	every	representative	in	the	assembly.		But	can	500	
participants	 truly	 represent	 100	 or	 200	 million	 constituents?	 	 This	 is	 much	 too	 small	 a	
representation.		Besides,	some	of	the	selected	representatives	may	not	be	able	to	participate.		In	an	
extreme	case,	if	the	actual	participation	rate	was	51%	(as	in	the	1996	National	Issue	Convention	in	
Austin,	Texas	(Wakao	2002:	207)),	is	there	any	legitimacy	to	the	argument	on	being	“mini-publics”	
or	a	“microcosmos”?		In	other	words,	the	two	conditions	of	equality	and	deliberation	are	met	(no	
matter	how	small	scaled),	but	the	condition	 for	participation	 is	clearly	not	met.	 	Are	there	any	
methods	 to	resolve	 this	“trilemma”	(Fishkin	2009)?	 	Also,	 in	 terms	of	 impact	on	public	policy	
making,	“if	 the	participants	cannot	expect	 to	see	 their	actions	and	recommendations	possibly	
“influence”	public	policies	at	 least	to	a	certain	degree,	the	desire	to	participate,	spend	time	for	
learning	and	understanding,	and	properly	deliberate	will	eventually	dry	up	 (Offe	2010:	128).”	
However,	finding	a	solution	to	this	is	relatively	easy.		For	there	is	certainly	a	method	to	get	political	
decision	making	closer	to	the	will	of	the	people.		
(Lastly,	 there	 is	 the	 fundamental	 issue	of	who	will	 organize	 such	deliberations.	 	They	are	
overwhelmingly	associations	(such	as	NPOs	and	 incorporated	 foundations),	research	 institutions	
including	colleges,	administrative	agencies	 including	municipalities,	and	their	 joint	organizations	
(Gastil/Levine	2005).		Many	experiences	have	been	accumulated	at	multiple	universities,	research	
institutions,	and	municipalities	in	Japan	as	well.)
3　Self-Governing Body Deliberative National Referendum (Direct Equal 
  　Participation)
This	 is	 the	 fourth	stage	setting,	a	deliberative	national	 referendum	 in	self-governing	bodies	
(omitting	the	other	direct	participation	method,	citizens	 initiative).	 	 In	either	the	 legislative	or	
advisory	type,	the	significance	of	political	decision-making	in	direct	participation	is	decidedly	greater	
than	that	of	the	various	 forms	of	 indirect	political	participation.	 	First,	based	on	the	principle	of	
popular	sovereign,	whether	in	the	theory	of	“popular	sovereign”	or	“the	people’s	sovereign,”	this	
referendum	can	legitimize	the	exercise	of	direct	legislative	right	of	the	sovereign.		This	is	because,	
in	principle,	we	cannot	exclude	the	will	of	the	sovereign	with	regards	to	the	form	of	implementing	
the	right	to	political	participation.		“If	we	should	be	excluded	from	the	direct	decision-making	due	to	
ignorance,	why	should	we	participate	in	the	selection	of	decision-makers	[parliament	members]?			If	
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there	is	a	reason	to	participate	in	the	selection	of	those	decision-makers,	why	isn’t	that	the	same	as	
the	reason	to	participate	 in	decision-making?	(Tsujimura	1996;	Budge	1996:	72;	Pateman	1970).”	
Second,	this	referendum	can	completely	satisfy	the	requests	 for	participation	and	equality,	 two	
formal	conditions	for	deliberative	democracy.		Third,	even	though	it	is	an	advisory	type,	this	setting	
can	practically	bind	the	will	of	legislators.		That	is	to	say,	when	making	a	policy	different	from	(or	
against)	the	result	of	a	national	referendum,	the	accountability	of	the	legislator	is	extremely	heavy	
and	more	difficult	to	explain	to	gain	the	understanding	and	agreement	of	the	people.
Since	a	national	referendum	is	certainly	ambiguous	(Imai	2000;	Yoshida	2007;	Abromeit	2003),	it	
is	necessary	to	meet	the	substantive	conditions	for	deliberation	and	the	universalizability	principle	in	
order	to	avoid	“mob	rule”	or	“the	danger	of	oppression	by	the	minority,”	and	enact	policies	and	laws	
presumed	to	be	based	on	fair	and	rational	recognition	and	judgment.		(Some	argue	that	because	the	
decision	by	national	referendum	will	directly	involve	the	people,	the	responsibility	of	their	will	can	
be	taken	seriously;	consequently,	they	will	voluntarily	study,	gather	information,	and	participate	in	
discussion.		As	mentioned	previously,	there	have	been	many	cases	like	that	 in	local	referendums.	
Still,	 that	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	deliberation	accompanying	participation	and	equality	 is	
performed	 all	 the	 time.)	 	 Furthermore,	 national	 referendum	 is	 not	 a	 deliberation	 by	 an	
overwhelmingly	smaller	number	of	people,	as	in	multivocal	public	opinion	or	“mini-publics.”		Thus,	
to	 realize	 it,	we	have	 to	 come	up	with	 a	 type	of	 deliberation	 for	 a	 large	number	of	 people.	
“Deliberation	Day”	(Ackerman/Fishkin	2003;	Fishkin	2009)	 is	perhaps	the	only	solution	to	 the	
aforementioned	trilemma.		(Imagine	selecting	50	million	citizens	out	of	100	million	registered	voters	
of	 the	U.S.	Presidential	 election	and	 then	holding	a	public	discussion	 in	every	community	of	
100,000.	 	Assuming	 that	 one-fifth	 of	 the	population	would	watch	 the	TV	coverage	of	 those	
discussions,	virtually,	two-thirds	of	the	entire	population	would	have	participated	in	some	form	of	
deliberation.)	 	 	However,	even	disregarding	the	enormous	financial	burden,	unless	 its	subjects	or	
issues	correspond	to	the	“nation-building”	scale,	this	proposal	is	not	realistic.		For	this	reason,	this	
idea	as	a	reference,	we	propose	an	organization	of	self-governing	community	deliberations	(Barber	
1984;	267-289).
①	We	will	 limit	subject	to	major	issues	that	will	 fundamentally	define	and	reform	the	life	of	the	
people	now	and	in	the	future	(e.g.	the	long-term	comprehensive	energy	policy	including	the	issue	of	
nuclear	energy	and	the	long-term	policy	to	establish	“food	sovereignty”).		②	We	will	create	briefing	
documents	equally	covering	all	the	different	arguments	related	to	the	subject.		③	We	will	distribute	
them	to	deliberators	in	advance	and	request	them	to	read	and	examine	them.		Any	citizens	wishing	
to	have	them	can	receive	them	(distribution	and	delivery).		④	In	approximately	1,700	municipalities	
(ward,	city,	town	and	village),	we	will	randomly	sample	100	deliberators	from	every	100,000	people.	
50,000	deliberators	approximately	correspond	to	1/10,000	of	constituents.	 	Small	groups	of	 ten	
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people	will	deliberate,	respectively.		Then,	based	on	the	main	questions	and	opinions,	they	will	have	
a	question	and	answer	session	in	a	large	group	with	politicians	(experts	and	journalists).		After	that,	
they	will	have	ten-person	group	deliberations	again.		The	event	will	be	completed	in	one	day.		⑤	
Simultaneously,	we	will	select	a	300-to-500	random	sample	of	deliberators	 from	47	prefectures.	
Small	groups	of	ten	people	will	have	a	deliberation,	respectively.		Based	on	the	main	questions	and	
opinions,	they	will	have	a	question	and	answer	session	in	a	large	group	with	politicians,	experts	and	
journalists.		After	that,	they	will	have	ten-person	group	deliberations	again.		The	entire	process	will	
be	aired	on	national	TV,	the	Internet,	or	radio.		The	event	will	be	completed	in	two	to	three	days.	
⑥	 Besides	 the	 traveling	 and	 accommodation	 expenses,	 compensation	 will	 be	 paid	 to	 the	
deliberators.		(For	example,	if	the	compensation	is	15,000	yen	a	day,	totally,	772.5	million	yen	will	
be	necessary.)	 	⑦	After	one	week,	we	will	hold	a	 two-to-three	choice	advisory-style	national	
referendum.		The	parliament	will	respect	its	results	and	make	decisions	based	on	them.
This	self-governing	body	deliberative	national	referendum	is	certainly	not	sufficient	 in	terms	of	
participation	(limited	to	the	participation	of	representatives).	 	Still,	 in	terms	of	 feasibility,	being	
connected	 to	national	 referendum,	hosting	 in	 every	municipality	 (highly	 likely	 to	 revitalize	
discussion	among	 family	members	and	neighbors,	between	acquaintances	and	 friends,	 at	 the	
workplace,	and	at	associations),	the	coverage	and	offer	of	discussion	programs	by	the	mass	media	
and	journalists,	and	presenting	a	solution	to	the	trilemma	(except	“Deliberation	Day”),	this	 is	the	
best	policy	as	of	now	to	realize	deliberative	democratic	politics	(Fig.	5).
4　Challenge of Associations: the Potential of Deliberative Democratic  
  　Society and Economy
Now,	deliberative	democracy	 is	 conditioned	upon	 the	equal	participation	of	 the	all	 parties	
concerned,	and	 the	understanding	and	agreement	based	on	 the	 interests	and	values	 that	are	
universalizable	through	deliberation.		Yet,	deliberative	democracy	is	not	limited	to	the	political	field	
on	a	nation-state	scale.	 	Rather,	 the	area	that	requires	decision-making	based	on	participation,	
equality,	and	deliberation	has	increasingly	expanded	both	internally	and	externally.		In	that	case,	it	
is	 important	to	have	the	perspective	that	small-scale	approaches	are	an	essential	prerequisite	to	
resolving	the	trilemma.	 	We	will	organize	the	 issues	 in	general	terms	by	 limiting	them	to	three	
areas.
(1) Establishing and Strengthening of the Local Self-Government:	the	adverse	effects	caused	by	
the	 ballooning	 of	 the	 current	 political	 system,	 self-reliance,	 and	 centralization,	 with	 the	
administrative	system	at	 its	core,	have	been	conspicuous	as	 it	 lost	 touch	with	 the	“will	of	 the	
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people,”	and	invited	the	distrust	of	politics.		The	combination	of	the	four	stage	settings	previously	
examined	 remains	 important	 and	effective.	 	This	 is	because	 the	nation-state	 frame	assumes	
indispensable	functions	such	as	the	guarantee	and	implementation	of	human	rights	and	the	“national	
minimum”	concept,	diplomacy	and	security,	 finance	and	monetary	policies,	not	 to	mention	the	
legislature,	executive,	and	judiciary.			However,	at	the	same	time,	we	also	need	to	strengthen	local	
self-government	 through	small-scale	approaches	and	decentralization	 in	order	 to	bring	political	
decision-making	closer	to	the	will	of	the	people.			The	implementation	of	small-scale	approaches,	the	
local	transfer	of	power	and	financial	sources,	and	the	complementation	principle	[Upper	communities	
will	assume	the	issues	that	lower	communities	cannot	handle,	while	the	central	government	will	be	
in	charge	of	 the	 issues	common	to	all	 lower	communities,	particularly	human	rights	 issues,	and	
issues	related	to	the	national	minimum	concept.		Otherwise,	regional	disparities	will	expose	human	
Figure 5　relationship among participation, equality and public discourse
（Fishkin 2009：89）
self-governing body
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“deliberation day”
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rights	and	living	to	danger.]	will	not	just	promote	the	interests	and	participation	of	the	people	and	
associations	toward	 local	politics.	 	In	the	first	place,	the	administration	and	parliament	of	a	self-
government	cannot	exist	and	function	without	associations	(Hirst	1994:	56-65).	 	For	 instance,	 in	
Sweden,	nearly	300	communes,	which	are	30,000-person-scale	municipalities,	have	 independent	
power	in	the	fields	of	welfare,	nursing	care,	education,	and	land	and	housing.		Taxation	rights	and	
the	right	 to	 issue	bonds	are	also	established.	 	Many	parliament	members	represent	educators,	
medical	and	welfare	personnel,	commune	staff,	corporate	workers,	and	the	elderly,	the	disabled,	
and	immigrants.		It	is	reported	that	female	parliament	members	account	for	approximately	30%	of	
the	 commune	parliament,	 and	approximately	40%	 in	23	Lansting	 (equivalent	 to	Prefecture)	
Parliaments	(Oyabu	2003:	134-135).
(2) Strengthening of Civic Society:	There	is	no	question	that	associations,	the	foundation	of	social	
movements	and	their	development,	are	involved	in	“social	movements	in	almost	all	categories	and	
areas,	and	the	organization	of	social	relations”	of	lifeworld	and	civic	society	(Oyabu	2003:	42).		What	
it	means	is	that	associations	are	replacing	the	functions	that	the	administrative	system	has	assumed	
(typically,	welfare	and	nursing	care	for	the	elderly,	and	support	and	welfare	for	the	disabled).		To	
further	enhance	this	 trend,	 	①	we	need	to	have	a	statue	 in	relation	to	associations	enacted	to	
regulate	and	 formally	recognize	them	so	that	they	meet	the	conditions	mentioned	 in	Section	2,	
Chapter	2.	 	 	②	At	the	same	time,	we	need	to	have	part	of	the	authority	that	the	administrative	
system	used	to	wield	transferred	to	associations	(a	transfer	of	social	power).	 	③	While	founding	a	
public	financing	system,	we	need	to	promote	mutual	financing	between	associations	and	establish	an	
independent	financial	base	in	civic	society	(Oyabu	2003:	20-26).
(3) Strengthening of Social and Economic Associations and Democratization of Corporations:	
The	development	of	associations,	mainly	NPOs,	co-ops	and	social	enterprises,	assumes	a	key	
position	 in	creating	a	sustainable	world,	society	and	region	against	 the	control	by	the	system,	
conserving	the	sustainable	ecosystem,	and	realizing	democracy	based	on	deliberative	democratic	
decision-making.		(I	owe	the	following	descriptions	in	this	section	basically	to	Kasuya	2009.)		Only	
three	indices	for	these	associations	will	be	pointed	out.
①	These	associations	are	already	active	in	resolving	the	major	issues	that	the	present	society	is	
faced	with.		“Non-government	and	non-profit	organizations	in	the	third	sector	have	drawn	attention	
in	recent	years,	and	the	reason	is	a	‘nation-state	crisis,’	which	has	occurred	in	the	world	in	the	last	
twenty	years.		This	crisis	is	reflected	in	serious	doubts	in	many	social	welfare	states	in	the	North,	
disappointment	in	government-led	development	projects	in	much	of	the	South,	and	the	collapse	of	
state	socialism	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	as	well	as	environmental	deterioration.		Due	to	this	
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crisis,	new	attention	and	expectation	have	been	paid	 to	civic	society	groups,	which	are	active	
throughout	 the	world.	 	Consequently,	 they	have	rapidly	grown	 in	number	and	scale,	 the	 true	
‘association	revolution	on	the	global	scale’	began,	and	private	and	voluntary	activities	organized	
across	the	globe	are	swelling	like	giant	waves.		Civic	society	groups,	prompted	by	suspicion	toward	
governments’	capability	to	cope	with	the	various	 issues	of	social	welfare,	development,	and	the	
environment	 that	 individual	nations	are	 facing	 today,	are	also	 inspired	by	 the	communication	
revolution	and	the	expansion	of	the	middle	class.
Finally,	in	recent	years,	because	of	one	element,	attention	to	nonprofits	and	civic	society	groups	
has	been	on	 the	 rise.	 	That	element	 is	 the	doubt	or	 suspicion	 toward	‘the	agreement	under	
neoliberalism.’		With	this	type	of	agreement,	they	believe	they	can	approach	the	above	issues	most	
effectively	by	the	simple	method	of	private	markets.	 	However,	this	agreement	has	generated	a	
world-scale	 financial	crisis	and	social	hardships	 in	many	regions,	placing	this	agreement	under	
increasingly	fierce	attack	.	.	.	the	civic	society	group	has	emerged	as	an	alternative	and	strategically	
important	participant	called	‘the	third	path.’		This	is	a	path	to	the	market	economy,	but	not	the	one	
to	market	society’	for	various	reasons:	 its	unique	position	of	being	outside	the	market	and	state,	
being	small-scaled	overall,	having	ties	 to	citizens,	 flexibility,	and	the	capability	 to	 take	private	
initiatives	 in	order	 to	support	public	objectives,	and	 the	capability	 to	 increase	‘social	capital’	
(Salamon	1999:	4-5).”
①　Specifically,	the	total	expenditure	of	22	nations	(including	Japan)	(1995)	reached	$1.1	trillion,	
equivalent	to	the	GDP	of	Italy,	accounting	for	4.6%	of	the	average	GDP	and	4.8%	of	employees	
(Salamon	1999).	 	The	‘EU	Social	Economy	Enterprises’	employ	approximately	8.3	million	(1998);	
its	social	enterprises	(characterized	by	continuous	economic	activity,	 local	capital,	and	employed	
labor)	have	been	tackling	welfare	and	social	services,	 job	creation,	social	 inclusion	(re-inclusion	to	
the	society	of	the	people	excluded	due	to	disparities,	poverty,	and	unemployment),	and	regional	
development	(Kasuya	2009:	87-98;	Tabata	2003:	37).		Throughout	the	world,	800	million	participate	
in	 the	 co-op	movement	 and	 the	 lives	 of	 3	 billion	 are	 sustained	by	 the	 co-op.	 	③	 In	 Japan,	
approximately	30%	of	households	belong	to	the	co-op;	volunteers	and	volunteer	groups	number	9	
million	and	90,000	(1999),	respectively;	and	the	number	of	certified	incorporated	NPOs	is	nearing	
approximately	25,000	(2005).	 	The	most	advanced	co-op,	“Seikatsu	(Life)	Club	Co-op,”	a)	creates	
safe	 food	and	daily	commodities	with	 little	environmental	 load	 in	partnership	with	producers,	b)	
founds	social	welfare	corporations	and	incorporated	NPOs	to	implement	public-participation	welfare	
projects	including	adult	day	care	services	and	the	management	of	special	nursing	homes,	c)	actively	
promote	political	 participation	 to	 implement	policies,	 under	 such	 themes	 as	 environmental	
conservation	and	 the	 improvement	of	 the	welfare	system	(“agent	movement”),	and	d)	 founds	
Workers’	Collectives	by	joint	 investment,	 joint	 labor,	and	joint	management;	almost	all	co-ops	 in	
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Japan	are	known	to	participate	in	the	same	activities	(Kasuya	:	247-252).
Those	associations	are	not	a	new	“social	system”	to	replace	corporations	and	markets	 in	the	
market	economy	system;	they	are	there	to	complement	both	the	political	system	and	the	market-
economy	system.		Thus,	they	are	not	in	an	antagonistic	relationship	with	the	administrative	system	
or	corporations;	rather,	they	are	in	a	partnership	with	them	(Hirst	1994).		This	category	constitutes	
the	core	of	deliberative	democratic	society	and	economy.
Nonetheless,	at	the	same	time,	corporations	and	markets	under	the	market	economy	system,	are	
also	venues	to	realize	a	deliberative	democratic	economy.		Many	tend	to	believe	that	the	market	
economy	system	is	“a	reified	system	.	.	 .	with	money	as	a	medium”	controlled	by	“twisted	and	
manipulated	communicative	 actions”	 (Habermas	1981).”	 	But	 this	 is	 a	wrong	and	one-sided	
understanding.		No	matter	how	badly	twisted	and	manipulated,	the	system	does	not	function	without	
communicative	action	(Kasuya	2007),	and	the	economic	activity	is	an	essential	foundation	to	support	
lifeworld.		Therefore,	a	reform	based	on	the	deliberative	democracy	of	corporations	and	the	market	
is	not	only	possible	but	also	indispensable.		There	are	three	paths	to	that	reform.		①	It’s	the	path	to	
strengthen	the	“surrounding”	by	the	legal	restrictions	of	the	political	system.		But	in	order	for	the	
political	system	to	function	 in	that	direction,	 it	 is	essential	 for	civic	society	and	public	opinion	to	
exercise	 influence.	 	Ultimately,	“the	socially	 integrating	power	of	solidarity	 [Directly	quoted.	
Solidarity	 is	not	a	power.]	can	self-accomplish	against	the	‘power’	of	two	other	control	sources,	
money	and	the	administrative	power,	only	when	proper	associative	relations	.	 .	 .	can	relatively	
provide	solidarity	with	the	opportunity	 for	development”	(Offe	1989:	762).	 	②	Also	effective	are	
social	movements	and	associations,	the	citizens	shareholders	movement	by	civic	society	and	public	
opinion,	the	pursuit	of	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR),	the	exercise	of	citizens’	evaluations	
(Ecomark,	FAIRTRADE	Mark,	 and	ecological	 footprint),	 and	direct	 actions	 such	as	boycott	
campaigns.	 	③	Democratization	of	corporations	 is	most	difficult,	but	one	of	 the	most	 important	
tasks.		④	To	do	so,	first,	it	is	necessary	to	raise	the	labor	unionization	rate,	which	has	dropped	to	
18.7%	(2005),	to	strengthen	its	 influence.	In	particular,	 it	 is	crucial	 for	non-regular	workers	and	
unorganized	workers	to	organize	a	local	union/community	union,	and	participate	in	the	movement.	
By	doing	so,	we	will	be	“able	to	exercise	influence,	inside	and	outside	corporations,	not	only	on	the	
universalizable	security	of	social	wages	and	employment	but	also	the	improvement	in	social	security.	
Second,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 implement	 a	 labor-management	 consultation	 system	 including	
codetermination	law	and	become	involved	in	the	administrative	operation	(However,	we	must	avoid	
the	turn	 into	a	‘manager’s	complement,’	which	so-called	 industrial	democracy	has	 fallen	 into.)	
Third,	it	is	necessary	to	obtain	participation	by	workers	using	the	employee	stock-ownership	plan.	
Those	will	be	the	main	tasks	 (Cohen/Rogers	2009:	4-17;	Hirst	1994:	42-57;	Dryzek	1990:	220;	
Kasuya	2009:	130).	 	At	any	rate,	along	with	the	revitalization	of	 labor	movement	and	labor	union	
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Figure 6　transformation of the relationship among association, civil society and political/
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activity	in	civic	society	and	the	public	sphere,	the	relationship	with	the	market	economy	system	will	
possibly	change	fundamentally	(Fig.	6).	 	Therefore,	using	that	as	a	foundation,	we	will	be	able	to	
discuss	the	formation	of	world	civic	society,	a	development	of	deliberative	democracy	on	a	global	
scale	(Fig.	7).
Figure 7　relationship among world civil society, nation state and trans-national enterprise
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